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SUMMARY
NASA is pursuing a program in Advanced
Subsonic Transport (AST) to develop the
technology for a highly reliable Fly-By-Light /
Power-By-Wire aircraft. One of the primary
objectives of the program is to develop the
technology base for confident application of
integrated PBW components and systems to
transport aircraft to improve operating reliability
and efficiency. Technology will be developed
so that the present hydraulic and pneumatic
systems of the aircraft can be systematically
eliminated and replaced by electrical systems.
These motor driven actuators would move the
aircraft wing surfaces as well as the rudder to
provide steering controls for the pilot. Existing
aircraft electrical systems are not flight critical
and are prone to failure due to Electromagnetic
Interference (EMI) (1), ground faults and
component failures. In order to successfully
implement electromechanical flight control
actuation, a Power Management and Distribution
(PMAD) System must be designed having a
reliability of 1 failure in 10 +9 hours, EMI
hardening and a fault tolerant architecture to
ensure uninterrupted power to all aircraft flight
critical systems.
The focus of this paper is to analyze, define, and
describe technically challenging areas associated
with the development of a Power By Wire
Aircraft and typical requirements to be
established at the box level. The authors will
attempt to propose areas of investigation, citing
specific military standards and requirements that
need to be revised to accommodate the "More
Electric Aircraft Systems".
INTRODUCTION
As electrohydraulic and electromechanical
actuators replace conventional hydraulically
driven effectors on the spoilers, flaps, and
rudders of US commercial aircraft, the source of
power of these actuators will increasingly
become flight critical. The source of electrical
power and the PMAD System must be highly
reliable and capable of delivering high quality
uninterrupted electrical power to the flight
critical loads. Flight critical loads are those
systems whose continued operation is necessary
in order to have sustained safe operation of the
aircraft while it is airborne. These loads must
remain operational, if for example, the aircraft
is struck by lightning or exposed to high
intensity radiated fields (HIRF).
Box level qualification procedures must be
established which both adequately describe the
threats, and assure that adequate margins remain
to ensure continued safe operation during a
threat occurrence.
This paper will identify specific problem areas
to be solved in the PBW program and typical
requirements to be established at the box level.
Proposed amendments to existing standards and
test procedures will be discussed.
Feasibility_ Issues
Many technical issues must be addressed in
order to realize the potential of Fly-By-Light
(FBL) and Power-By-Wire (PBW) systems. To
ensure the safety of crew and passengers these
systems will be required to meet reliability
probabilities of 1 failure in 10+9 hours of
operation. The design of these systems must be
inherently fault tolerant. In the event that
equipment failures or electrical faults on the
distribution bus occur, the PMAD system must
autonomously reconfigure and continue to
supply electrical power to flight critical
electrical loads.
Some examples of flight critical loads would be
the flight control computer, the electrical
actuators and their respective controllers. In the
event that a source fault occurs, non-essential
loads must immediately be shed and the system
must be reconfigured to supply critical loads
from alternate sources. During normal operation
established power quality levels will be
maintained, but during abnormal operation
system bus voltages and frequencies may vary
from their nominal values by a predetermined
amount. The acceptability and impact of this
occurrence must be balanced against the input
tolerances of the avionics equipment.
The electrical system must be designed in such
a manner that faults occurring in one part of the
system cannot propagate throughout the system
affecting other electrical loads.
Fault Tolerant Requirements
In order to meet the established PBW aircraft
reliability requirements, a highly reliable
redundant PMAD system will be required to
supply electrical power to flight critical loads.
Once this system is designed it must be
carefully tested and validated as flight worthy.
Extensive testing will be required to establish a
specific reliability at a certain confidence level.
Redundancy involves designing one or more
alternate signal paths into the system through the
addition of parallel elements. A number of
approaches are available to improve reliability
through redundant design. Redundant design
approaches can be classified on the basis of how
the redundant elements are introduced into the
circuit to provide a parallel signal or power path.
The results of numerous data collection efforts
have shown that the reliability of fielded
equipment and systems is degraded from three
to ten times the potential predicted reliability
during design.(2) The transition from paper
design, to production, to field operations
introduces degradation factors which constrain
the expected reliability.
There are two major classes of redundancy:
Active and Standby. In active redundant
systems external components are not required to
perform the functions of detection or making the
decision of when to switch to a standby element
when the primary path fails. In standby
redundant systems, external elements are
required to detect a failure condition and to
make the decision to switch to a secondary path
to bypass the failed element.
Another form of redundancy can exist in
addition to the two major classes stated above.
This form uses parallel paths within normal non-
redundant design configurations. Parallel paths
within a network would be sized to carry the
added load when an element failure in another
parallel path occurs. (3)
Derating can be defined as the operation of a
part at less severe stresses than those for which
it is rated. Derating can be accomplished by
either reducing stresses or by increasing the
strength of the part. Selecting a part of greater
strength is usually the most practical approach.
The failure rate of the part tends to decrease as
the applied stress levels are decreased below the
rated value. As higher stresses and temperatures
are applied to a given part its failure rate
increasesproportionally. (4)
Reliability is strongly dependentupon the
operatingconditionsthat areencountered uring
the entire life of the equipment. High
temperature imposes a severe stress on
electroniccomponentssinceit cancausefailure
due to the melting of solder joints and slow
deterioration of performance levels due to
chemicaldegradationeffects. Thermalshockis
the effect of varying the temperature of a
component over extreme ranges in a short
period. Theresult is over-stressingof thedevice
resulting in cracks, mechanical failures and
ultimately changedelectricalproperties.(3)
A rangeof environmentalstressesplay a role in
how well a device meets the required
specifications. Examples of environmental
stressesarehigh and low temperatures,thermal
shock, mechanicalshock, vibration, humidity,
salt atmosphere and spray, electromagnetic
radiation,nuclear/ cosmic radiation, sand, dust
and low pressure due to high altitude.
An operational experiment could be conducted
by performing a large number of trials to
establish high-reliability at a high confidence
level. If this is not acceptable due to time and
cost, a simulated life experiment could begin
with a natural life experiment and be augmented
by using probability and design arguments. In
order to meet a high reliability requirement, an
equally high confidence level for the system test
experiment is required. If the system can
successfully complete a large number of trials
without failure, then the system can be said to
have the required reliability at the. required
confidence level. Using a probability formula,
one may calculate the required number of trials
to achieve a given confidence level. (5)
Achieving a reliable confidence level of 1
failure in lxl09 trials would require 21x109
successful trials. This large number of trials can
be reduced to a manageable level by using
statistics, injecting faults during test trials, and
monitoring of the fault tolerant system during
testing. Using these approaches, a validation
procedure could be developed for a class of fault
tolerant systems which will ensure that the target
systems can achieve a high degree of reliability
through reconfiguration and
periodic maintenance.
To support system validation hybrid (analog
and digital) computers may be used to perform
system simulations, set tolerances and
instrumentation ranges, simulate Failure Effects
Mode Analysis (FEMA) results, and further
support the analysis phase of a systems
reliability estimate.
EMI / HIRF Requirements & System
Certification
The FBL / PBW PMAD system, the flight
control and other aircraft flight critical systems
must be immune to EMI and HIR£ energy.
During these events, the PMAD system must
continue to operate nominally and meet
minimum power quality requirements.
The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) fall
1993 meeting of the AE-7D panel discussed
limits for input current harmonics associated
with AC input power conversion (utilization)
equipment. Preliminary specifications
establishing limits on input current harmonics
are being circulated for review by utilization
equipment manufacturers. Specifications
targeted for revision include MIL - STD - 1399
Section 300A (NAVY), Boeing commercial
aircraft specifications and IEC 555-2. These
new limits will reduce the amount of current
harmonics that equipment may conduct into the
aircraft electrical system thus improving overall
power quality of the system.
In March of 1990 the Department of
Transportation issued an Advisory Circular
addressing the protection of aircraft electrical
and electronic systems against the indirect
effectsof lightning. The document provides
acceptance criteria and protection levels
(hardening approaches) against the indirect
effects of lightning, its effects on equipment and
associated wiring that is mounted on the aircraft
interior and exterior.
Sources of EMI due to portable electronics
inside the aircraft (carried on by passengers)
have been identified. (6) Actions are presently
being taken by the Radio Technical Commission
for Aeronautics (RTCA) to prevent interference
with on-board instrumentation. These actions
include the forming of a sub-committee (SC-
177) by the RTCA that will address these issues
and form a resolution. The sub-committee
action plan consists of establishing test methods
and criteria, testing of Portable Entertainment
Devices (PED), conduction of in-aircraft testing
and computer modeling. A final report is due
out June 30, 1994.
Line replaceable unit (LRU) level qualification
procedures must be established which will
enable the certification of the system at the box
level thus reducing the overall, cost and time
invested in PBW system certification. One
possible approach would be to use end-to-end
system modeling to define the interaction
between each LRU and the system. If
individual LRU specifications are met, proper
system operation should be guaranteed.
Power Quality and Regenerative Power
Considerations
Next generation aircraft PMAD systems will be
required to both deliver and receive electrical
power from a variety of electrical loads while
maintaining system power quality within
established levels during "normal" system
operation. Electric "engine starting" and
"emergency" operation are system states that are
excluded from "normal" operation power quality
requirements. (7) Present power quality
requirements, namely distortion spectrum and
transient envelopes, must be carefully reviewed
to ensure that next generation PMAD design
criteria is satisfied.
Regenerative power is the process whereby the
overhauling load ona DC motor, or the sudden
increase in speed of an AC motor, result in the
motor generating a current that is returned to
the source bus. Regenerative braking is
accomplished by decreasing the inverter
frequency to the extent that the corresponding
synchronous speed is lower than that of the
motor speed. (8) This causes the motor to
behave as a generator, converting the
mechanical energy to electrical energy which is
returned to the source electrical bus. For
example, regeneration operation could occur
when aircraft surfaces are moved back to their
normal positions.
If this regenerative power could be harnessed it
could be used to supplement the source power of
the electrical bus. However, harnessing this
power can prove to be a challenging endeavor.
Bi-directional power converters must be utilized
to reverse the power flow back onto the source
bus or into a shunt resistance, in the event that
the source system cannot accept the reverse
energy.
Various power converter topologies are being
studied that can most efficiently process this
regenerated energy. Before this process of
recapturing the regenerative energy can be
accomplished, however, several technical
problems must be resolved. The regenerated
power must meet system power quality
standards so that it does not cause interference
to loads on the source distribution bus. The use
of regenerative power will reduce the demand on
the primary sources and increase the overall
efficiency of the aircraft.
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Secondary Power Considerations
Because the primary flight surfaces in a PBW
next generation aircraft would be electrically
actuated, the nominal electrical power system
loading placed on the aircraft will be greater
than that of a conventional aircraft. In the event
of a primary electrical system failure, a
secondary system must be available to supply
electrical power to flight critical electrical loads,
actuators and controllers.
Emergency sources will be required on next
generation aircraft. The options considered must
be carefully reviewed and traded off to ensure
that the aircraft design goals are satisfied as well
as those of the aircraft secondary power system.
Examples of secondary electric power presently
in use on conventional aircraft are ram air
turbine (RAT) and lead acid batteries. Next
generation aircraft designers may consider
alternative sources of energy for secondary
electrical power.
Examples of alternative Sources of energy
storage could be mechanical (flywheel) batteries
or fuel cells. Flywheel batteries, unlike their
electrochemical (battery) counterparts, can
quickly be recharged and offer a lower weight
alternative to conventional batteries.
Mechanical batteries store their electrical power
in the form of rotational momentum of
flywheels. These flywheel batteries are
presently in use in Basel, Switzerland
supplementing diesel-electric trolleys. (9)
Mechanical batteries may prove to be a
promising secondary power storage medium due
to their ability to quickly absorb transients of
regenerated energy from the electrically powered
mechanical actuators. This regenerated energy
could be quickly stored and supplied to other
utilization equipment on the primary or
secondary distribution busses.
PBW Enhanced Electrical System Mass vs.
Conventional Aircraft System Mass
Trade studies have been conducted to evaluate
the weight savings of replacing pneumatic,
hydraulic, bleed air and ice protection systems
with electrically actuated systems and results
have been favorable. The resulting electrical
load of an all-electric secondary power system
would be much greater than that of a
conventional aircraft due to the shifting of loads
from pneumatic & hydraulic power to electrical.
The PMAD system can be augmented to
accommodate the additional electrical loading.
Despite the increased electrical loading the
overall vehicle weight will be lessened by
approximately 2300 pounds on a twin jet
commercial aircraft.(10) This lessened weight
will translate directly into longer range and
lower operating costs for the air carrier.
Military Specifications & FAA Requirements
pertaining to the PBW PMAD
Many military specifications are Written "open
ended" so that they may be tailored to a specific
application. Existing aircraft electrical system
specifications must be reviewed in detail and
amended to recognize external threats, to ensure
that future PMAD systems will deliver
uninterrupted quality electrical power to flight
critical loads. In many instances (i.e., MiI-STD-
704), military standards do not accurately
define transient and undervoltage testing to
adequately represent the threats. This results in
the individual loads having to incorporate
internal, protection and reserve power supplies to
sustain equipment through voltage drops on the
bus. This increases the weight, complexity and
cost of the entire system while lowering its
reliability.
Studies have been conducted that indicate that
MIL-STD-704 voltage distortion spectrum limits
and MIL-STD-461 current limits do not agree.
Distortion requirements cited in MIL-STD-704
addresselectrical power quality requirements
that are measured on the aircraft at the
connection point of the utilization
equipment. (11)
LeRC Role in the FBL/PBW Program
The FBL/PBW subsonic transport aircraft
program is managed at NASA Lewis Research
Center by the Advanced Subsonic Technology
office in the Aeronautics Directorate. Technical
direction and technology development for FBL
and PBW are provided by the Instrumentation
and Control Technology and Power Technology
Divisions, respectively. Primary contractors
involved in the program include the Boeing
Commercial Aircraft Division and McDonnell
Douglas Aerospace Transport Aircraft Division
in. the FBL and PBW portions, respectively.
Program goals include the flight test of optically
interfaced controls and electrical actuation
technology, a proof of concept PMAD ground
test bed, and a starter-generator ground
demonstration.
Conclusion
Issues pertaining to the development of a highly
reliable electrically actuated aircraft have been
addressed. Some of the specifications have been
named that will require revision to incorporate
the requirements germane to a flight critical
PMAD system. In conclusion, the leap from
conventional hydraulically driven aircraft
systems to Fly-By-Light / Power-By-Wire
commercial aircraft systems will be a challenge
to airframe designers and engineers. The
benefits of reduced bleed air requirements,
improved engine efficiency, integral - .
starter/generator technology, electrically driven
flight control actuators and environmental
control system will result in a more reliable, fuel
efficient vehicle for commercial air travel.
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